Introduction
Banks and other financial intermediaries perform the economic functions of providing liquidity, transferring funds from savors to investors and collecting and diffusing information (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond, 1984; Merton, 1995; Gorton and Winton, 2003) . These functions involve value adding activities of facilitating payments and managing cash, selecting and monitoring borrowers and providing advice and consultation services. Banks use labor, capital and other inputs to perform these activities and earn revenues from interest rates differentials and fees. The level of efficiency in performing banking intermediation activities is a key factor for economic development (Buera, Kaboski and Shin, 2011; Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang, 2010; Mehra, Piguillem and Prescott, 2011) and changes in the costs of intermediation will have important macroeconomic consequences for investment and growth (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999; Hall, 2011; Christiano and Ikeda, 2011).
In conventional competitive markets, profits are the reward for providing services demanded by costumers at the lowest cost. The expansion of banks' balance sheets around the world and the record-high growth rates of profits and productivity until 2007 could have been an indicator of substantial efficiency gains in financial intermediation. However, the outburst of the severe financial crisis in 2007 showed that, at least for the case of banks, the usual indicators of performance might fail in informing about their "true" economic results 1 . Potential explanations of this paradox can be the existence of managerial incentives to distort reported profits (Rajan 1994) , financial innovations for regulatory arbitrage (Achayra, Schuabl, Suarez 2011), measuring profits and output not adjusted for risk (Haldane, Brennan and Madouros, 2010) , and business model innovations that change the nature of banks' output over time (Philippon, 2012) , such as the "originate to distribute" model, and the market-based intermediation or shadow banking. 1 Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) document this paradox with detail. In the UK, the resources labour and physical capital consumed as inputs in the financial intermediation industry, relative to labour and capital of the whole economy, have been decreasing since the nineties while the share of gross value added of the financial intermediation industry in the gross value added of the whole economy rose almost 3 percentage points, to 8%, in 2007. According to the Banker data set, the assets of the 1000 world largest banks more than doubled in the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . During the same time period, the profits of these largest banks increased 150% for an average annual rate of return of 15% (around 20% of return on equity, twice the return in the rest of industries, for the whole banking industry in the UK, US and Europe). In Spain, using the EU-KLEMS data base, estimated annual cumulative productivity growth in the period 1999-2007 was 8% (O'Mahony and Timmer 2009).
In this paper, we rely on bank-level productivity estimations to quantify the there was an unprecedented expansion of the housing industry and (iii) banks financed a good part of the loans with wholesale financing and short-term debt. However, Spain has also different features from the USA and other countries in two main aspects 2 . First, securitized loans remained in the balance sheets of banks and they were subject to capital requirements, and, second, savings banks, with market share similar than commercial banks, compete in an equal basis with commercial banks.
The estimates of the bank-level total factor productivity (from now on, productivity) are derived from the estimation of the banks' production function. We model the production and sales of bank services at the branch level assuming a Leontief technology (Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás, 2008) with two variable inputs, labour and services from information technology assets (IT capital), and a quasi-fixed input (the physical capacity of the branch). Then, the branch-level production function is aggregated to obtain the bank-level production function, which is the function that we empirically estimate with Spanish banks data. The estimation of the technology parameters follows the methodology posited in Olley and Pakes (1996) and extended in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to control for the potential simultaneity bias between the unobserved productivity shock and the management decisions on input quantities in response to the shocks.
Next, we explore what is behind the estimated productivity. As indicated, the ultimate goal is to isolate the "true" economic efficiency of the banking industry, as the ultimate indicator of the actual contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth and to macroeconomic stability. For this purpose, we isolate the factors that can determine the estimated productivity values due to reasons different from technical 2 For a detailed description of the the securitization process in Spain compared with other countries, and of the regulatory treatment of assets' securitized in Spain, see Catarineu and Pérez (2008) .
progress and economic efficiency. These factors include, on the one hand, differences in the operating characteristics of banks in the sample (Berger and Mester, 1997; Frei, Harker and Hunter, 2000) and, on the other hand, factors related with the proximate causes of the crisis, which will be the focus of this paper. In other words, we aim at exploring whether certain business decisions of banks (such as concentrating loans in the housing market, issuing securities and short-term debt to finance the loans, increasing leverage, etc) improve the short-term private performance of banks but at the social cost of future financial instability that became evident with the crisis.
Our empirical results show that the productivity growth rate of the Spanish banking industry more than doubled during the years after the Euro, a result that is consistent with other productivity estimates obtained from other methodologies and with aggregate industry data (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009). However, we also find that an important part of this productivity growth in the pre-crisis years is explained by business decisions that, ex-post, have been identified as drivers of the crisis (expansion of the housing market, securitization, short-term finance and increasing leverage). When removing these and other operational factors from the estimated productivity, the productivity residual grows at a similar rate in the years before and after the introduction of the Euro. In other words, we show that the high growth rates of raw productivity estimated for the banking industry during the years prior to the crisis were not an indicator of efficiency and technical progress.
The paper is related to the long list of published papers on productivity and efficiency of banks 3 . We are the first in estimating the total factor productivity (TFP) from a Leontief-type production function formulated at the branch level. Most of the productivity estimates in banking are obtained with cost or profit functions (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) 4 . This paper is also, up to our knowledge, the first one to estimate the production function and the productivity of banks considering IT capital as a productive input, what seems essential in one of the most IT-capital intensive industries. function of banks following the methodology in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) .
Our paper is also related with the growing literature interested in measuring the cost efficiency of financial intermediation, either through a more accurate measurement of the output of banks and market-based (shadow banking) intermediaries (Philippon, 2012) , or through the calculation of risk-adjusted measures of productivity (Haldane, Brennan and Madouros, 2010; Basu, Inklaar and Wang, 2011). Our contribution regarding this literature is twofold: First, we estimate the production function and the productivity values using bank-level data, whereas the previous papers use aggregate industry data for their estimations. Second, our analysis goes beyond the scope of these papers, obtaining a more accurate estimation of the contribution of technical progress to the productivity growth of the banking industry, and provides an empirical test for some of the theories about the causes of the financial crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the production technology of banks and the methodology used in the estimation of productivity.
Section 3 shows the results of the estimation of the production function and average productivity for the Spanish banking industry from bank-level data. Section 4 contains an analysis of the determinants of the observed productivity of Spanish banks, in the context of the banking practices that have been related with the causes behind the recent financial crisis. The conclusions summarize the main results of the paper.
Production function estimation
In this section, we describe the methodology proposed for the estimation of the banks' production function. Relying on this, we estimate banks' productivity. Our starting point is based on the empirical fact that retail banks' services are produced at branches, which provide the physical space for employees, computer terminals and other physical infrastructure needed in the production process. If the branches of one bank are relatively similar, the output (inputs) of the bank can be computed as the output (inputs)
per branch, multiplied by the number of branches. Once in the branch, customers receive services that are produced combining labor and IT capital inputs, being the branch's capacity an indivisible and fixed input. Since bank services are not directly observable and measurable 5,6 , we rely on the assumption that the variability across banks in services produced can be approximated by the sum of loans and deposits, at constant prices.
The production function
The 
Therefore, the branch production technology is of the Leontief-type with a given investment in fixed capital that limits the total capacity of the branch. The function F( ) is assumed to be increasing and concave in the two variable inputs, labor and IT capital. Equation (1) assumes constant returns to scale at the bank level (i.e. output of the bank is a scale factor of the output per branch) 7 . If the function F( ) at the branch level is linear homogeneous then equation (1) can be written as,
where N=B N b and IK=B IK b denote labor and IT inputs, at the bank level, respectively.
We assume that the capacity q is non-binding for the standard branch, so the observed level of output is determined by the function F(N, IK). For the rest of the paper, the actual specification of the constant returns to scale production function will be written as, 5 Bank services include the marketing of loans, deposits and payment services; the evaluation of the credit quality of the potential borrowers; the monitoring of loans and possible defaults; provision of liquidity; book keeping and monitoring of deposit accounts; selling and book keeping of saving products and so on. 6 The paper adopts the production approach instead of the intermediation approach to model the relationship between inputs and outputs in banks; this amounts to using deposits as a measure of output together with loans. The assumption that banks consume inputs (i.e., labour and IT services) to obtain deposits (output) is realistic in the evaluation of the productivity of banks at the branch level and in the aggregate. Other papers that use the sum of loans and deposits as a measure of single output of banks are Humphrey (1992), Prasad and Harker, (1997), Tirtiroglu, Daniels, and Tirtiroglu (2005) . A different issue is how banking services tied to lending and those tied to the deposits combine to give a measure of total bank output. 7 We formally test this assumption and find empirical evidence supporting it. , ) (
is the total factor productivity term of the production function, which is increasing with the productivity shock .
Estimation of the production function: Methodology
The estimation of the parameters of production function (3) follows the methodology proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and extended by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . In both cases the concern is to correct for the endogenous bias in the estimation of the elasticity of output with respect to labor and capital caused by the fact that the quantity of labor input used in production may itself be determined by the value of the productivity shock.
The estimation procedure, adapted to this particular case, proceeds as follows. Let be the log-transformation of the production function in (3) where ε is a the pure stochastic component. The term ω is a state variable in the firm decision problem and, therefore, it affects the demand for inputs. This variable is observable to the firm's manager but not to econometricians. We do not impose the condition of constant returns to scale, which will be empirically tested. . Subtracting the expectation of (5) conditional on (τ ιt, ik ιt ) from (5) we obtain 8 Olley and Pakes (1996) propose to use capital investment as proxy variable τ. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) extend the list of observable variables correlated with the productivity shock that can be used in the estimation procedure to eliminate the potential estimation bias. They argue that adjustment costs could imply that firms decide not to invest even though the productivity shock exists. To overcome this limitation they propose to use intermediate inputs as proxy variables of productivity shocks.
This equation can be estimated using the non-parametric approach proposed by Levinsohn 
where the residuals are expressed in terms of the candidate * ik β . Let define a set of orthogonality conditions
where z t is a vector that includes {ik t , ik t-1 , n t-1 }. Then, ik βˆ is estimated by minimizing the GMM criterion function defined from the orthogonal conditions of the population:
where h indexes the H instruments. To measure the precision of our estimates, we use bootstrapped standard errors of the coefficients. 10 Finally, the GMM estimator of ik β is chosen for a grid search as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) since this is more robust than using starting candidate value * ik β (as for example the OLS estimator).
9 Alternatively, parameter n β in Equation (5) can be estimated using OLS including some approximation for function ϕ t (.). Olley and Pakes approximate this function with a polynomial expansion in τ t and ik t 10 Petrin, Poi and Levinsohn. (2004) provide an estimation command that implements this methodology in Stata. This command allows the estimation of production function using one or two proxies of productivity and one variable of capital (non-variable inputs). In this paper we will need the inclusion of two variables of capital, i.e. branches and IT capital.
Database and variables
We draw bank-level data from the non-consolidated confidential balance sheets and 
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(loans) in year t. After their estimation at current prices, all inputs and outputs in monetary units are deflated and expressed in prices of year 1992. increase in the total factor productivity of banks.
Estimation of the production function
The estimates of the parameters of the production function are presented in Table 2 (bellow, we discuss robustness checks in more detail). In banking firms, the link between the productivity shocks and the external purchases of intermediate inputs may 12 The main reason why Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) posited intermediate inputs as an alternative proxy to investment in capital is the existence of adjustment costs that could result in firms that do not invest in some periods. It would imply a large proportion of zero-investment observations in the sample that could not be used in the estimations. In our application, all banks in the sample invest a positive amount in IT during all the years of the period.
be weaker than in industrial firms because in banks the elasticity of output to variations in the inputs is expected to be small compared with that in industrial firms. In addition, investment in IT was the variable that better fitted the three specification tests posited by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in the selection of the proxy variable: i) monotonicity, i.e. higher levels of investments are associated to higher values of the productivity for any level of IT capital (see Figure A1 in the Appendix A); ii) correction of the bias: the estimated coefficient of labour (IT capital) is lower (higher) in the correction of simultaneity than in the OLS estimation, as expected; and finally iii) orthogonality of the freely variable input (labour, in this case) and the innovation in productivity in t+1
(the estimated correlation (-2.07%) is not significant at 10%).
The two columns in the left-hand side of Table 2 Therefore, the estimation using OLS would imply that the production technology of banks, both at the bank and at the branch level, has decreasing returns to scale. Results are different when the estimation is performed taking into account the potential simultaneity between the firm's input decisions and its productivity using IT investment as a proxy of productivity (lower part of Table 2 ). Now, the null hypotheses of constant returns to scale at the bank level and at branch level cannot be rejected at any standard 
Robustness tests
The estimates of the production function using different definitions of intermediate inputs (expenses on electricity and other supplies, on office stationary, on external administrative services and on total operating costs) as alternative proxies of the productivity are reported in Table A1 Therefore, we present only the estimates of the whole sample period and focus on these
coefficients to measure and further analyze the productivity level of Spanish banks.
Productivity in the banking industry
Using the estimations of the elasticity parameters reported in Table 2 of the production function in Equation (5), the productivity level of bank i in year t, denoted as p it , can be estimated as:
Then, relying on the banklevel productivity estimates, we construct the indicator of industry wide average productivity as the weighted average of the banks' productivity using the shares of the banks in terms of output as weights. Olley and Pakes (1996) distinguish between two sources that may explain the evolution of the industry productivity. On the one hand, the evolution of the (un-weighted) average productivity of the firms in the industry and, on the other hand, a term that captures the differences in productivity that are associated with the size of the bank: Figure 1 shows the evolution of the industry productivity (p t ) and its two components. The productivity of the banking industry has shown an increasing trend over the whole time period that is attributable to both, productivity gains of the average bank, and to a positive reallocation effect. The facts that bigger entities have been more 13 As in Olley and Pakes (1996), Nakane and Weintraub (2005) and Buch, Koch and Kötter (2009), we estimate the productivity as a residual from the difference between the observed and the predicted output of the bank in time period t, not the productive efficiency (distance to an efficient frontier) to be consistent with the general methodology. Implicit along the paper is also the assumption that the elasticity of output with respect to labor and IT capital are the same for banks of different characteristics; in other words, the heterogeneity of banks only affects the constant of the production function. 14 For a similar decomposition applied to Spanish manufacturing industry see Fariñas and Ruano (2004) . 
What is behind the observed productivity?
Our measure of productivity for each bank and year is the residual obtained from the difference between the actual output of the bank (loans plus deposits) minus the output predicted from the quantities of labor and IT capital. One of the determinants of the productivity differences which matters most for welfare analysis is the underlying differential in intermediation efficiency. We measure the intermediation efficiency of the banking industry as the Hicks-neutral technological progress that determines the time trend in productivity, after removing other sources of cross-section and time variability from the pooled data of banks' productivity. Among these other sources of productivity differences, we particularly focus on the changes in the balance sheet of banks that have been pinpointed as potential factors of the outburst of the financial crisis: increasing risk taking, excessive growth and higher illiquidity risk.
In this section we first document the changes in the assets and liabilities of Spanish banks that preceded the financial crisis. Next, we hypothesize how these changes may have affected the estimated productivity of banks. Finally, we estimate an empirical model on determinants of banks' productivity for the double purpose of testing the hypotheses and estimating the residual technical progress in the banking industry.
The behavior of Spanish banks in the pre-crisis period
The situation of Spanish banks in the pre-crisis period can be summarized as follows: i)
Spain joined the Euro zone benefiting from low interest rates and financial integration when monetary policies by Central Banks around the world, including the ECB, were extremely accommodative; ii) prices and demand of real estate-related assets, including houses, experienced a high increase and banks provided the credit to fund this expansion; iii) Spanish banks used a combination of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and short-term funding to finance the lending to real estate developers and house buyers; iv) banks were able to comply with regulatory capital and sustain the high level of credit growth by issuing hybrid financial products, cheaper than pure equity. The The maturity of the wholesale finance for the banks that get funds from these markets is measured by the weighted maturity of wholesale financing (variable were fulfilled with debt-like instruments.
Implications for productivity and productivity growth
We now explain why these changes in the balance sheet of banks can have positive effects on productivity and productivity growth over time.
Real estate and mortgage loans. We identify two reasons why the concentration of loans in real estate and mortgages can have positive effects on productivity: lower screening and higher loan-to-value ratios.
On the one hand, the incentives of banks for screening the credit quality of the borrower in collateralized loans are milder than in loans without collateral ( On the other hand, the expectation of permanent increase in house prices could have inclined bank managers to grant loans with higher loan-to-value ratios than in periods with flatter expectations. This higher loan-to-value ratio per average loan can be translated to higher productivity since, with the same amount of inputs, banks can produce a higher balance of loans due to the higher average size of the loans granted.
Therefore, our first hypothesis can be stated as follows:
Securitization. We expect that banks that traditionally financed their loans with deposits and, at some point in time, start to obtain finance issuing securities backed with loans will experience an increase in productivity for reasons related with changes in the business model rather than with technical progress.
In traditional banking there is a relationship between the use of inputs (labor and IT capital) and the total output of banks in such a way that an increment of the bank's output (loans plus deposits) has to be accompanied by an increase in the use of inputs.
However, in the "originate to securitize" model, banks have become "intermediaries", not "producers" of deposits and loans. The issuance of MBS provided Spanish banks with funds to grant loans directly from the market and outside the network of branches.
Therefore, banks obtain funds to grant new loans without opening new branches and/or increasing the use of inputs in old and new ones, something that they could not do if they were to obtain funds from deposits.
Securitization also changed lending practices by banks. The creditworthiness of securitized loans was based on the qualifications of rating agencies and not so much on the detailed soft information collected by bank officers. These agencies did not have close information about the beneficiary of the loan (homeowner, for example), so they could process only hard information such as the credit score of the borrower and the loan-to-value ratio. As a consequence, bank officers stopped collecting this information and focused only on lending to borrowers that could have good credit scores and observable adequate loan-to-value ratios (Diamond and Rajan 2009 ). Collecting the useful soft information on the credit quality of the borrowers was more time consuming than collecting the hard information of the credit score. This is another reason why issuing MBS banks might have increased the ratio of output relative to inputs.
Short-term wholesale funding. Securitization was not the only way banks had to raise funds in financial markets. Under the umbrella of the Euro, Spanish banks became net borrowers in the interbank market and they issued bonds and other debt instruments to fill the gap between loans and deposits.
Ideally, long-term loans should have been financed with long-term debt instruments but it is well known that, under the expectation of future low interest rates, leveraged banks have incentives to finance with short-term debt, becoming more illiquid (Diamond and Rajan, 2009b) . Moreover, investors were keen to provide banks with short-term finance because it facilitated the option to exit if things went wrong and banks got into trouble (Diamond and Rajan, 2001 ). Spanish banks were probably affected by these incentives and took advantage of the cheaper and practically unlimited short-term finance through the interbank and the financial markets. Then, it can be expected that banks tended to adopt a financial structure more oriented to short-term leverage, even though their loans had a long-term maturity. The high credit growth rates of loans among Spanish banks together with stable dividend policies increased the regulatory capital requirements above the retained earnings. In order to comply with capital requirements, banks issued hybrid instruments instead of issuing equity 16 because the former were less costly (i.e., interests of hybrid instruments were tax deductible). As a result, we could observe the apparent paradox of banks keeping their regulatory capital ratio at constant levels while they were becoming more leveraged, since the regulatory requirements were fulfilled with debt-like instruments.
Regulatory capital and leverage

Empirical model on the determinants of banking productivity
The full econometric model on determinants of productivity differences of banks is formulated as follows:
, ln The dependent variable is the log of productivity of bank i in year t obtained as a residual, as explained above. There are three sets of explanatory variables. The first one, j it x , includes the variables in Table 3 that account for the presumed positive effect on productivity due to credit growth in real estate and mortgages, securitization, short term 16 Savings banks do not have equity in their balance sheet, so they cannot issue common shares. finance and leverage. The second block, Table 4 .
The third block of explanatory variables is the time dummy variables d t , equal to1 when the observation belongs to year t and zero otherwise. The parameters associated to the time-dummy variables, t, capture the time effects on productivity common to all banks in the industry. We estimate a variation of model (7) where the time-dummy variables are replaced by macroeconomic variables of the Spanish economy (i.e., inflation, interest rates and business cycle) together with a time trend variable. In this specification, the coefficient of the time trend variable will be our estimate of the industry technical progress. Finally, ν it is the random error term.
The model is estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at bank level and the results are presented in Table 5 . Specification I shows the results of estimating the model as it is formulated in [7] , whereas in Specification II shows the time dummy variables are substituted by macroeconomic variables (growth of GDP, inflation and interbank interest rate) and the trend variable. The estimated coefficients of the common variables in both specifications are similar in magnitude and statistical significance.
Productivity and proximate causes of the crisis
Our estimation results confirm that the differences in the observed productivity of banks can be explained, to a large extent, by the changes in the assets composition of banks documented in Table 3 and related to "proximate causes" of the crisis. As expected, the proportion of real estate and mortgages in the loans portfolio of banks is positively correlated with productivity. This result confirms the hypothesis that the specialisation in this type of products in the pre-crisis period can explain part of the observed increase in gross productivity of banks over time. The coefficient of the variable proportion of securitized assets is also positive and statistically significant, confirming that generateto-securitize is more productive in terms of labour and IT capital services consumed than traditional banking. The negative coefficient of the variable Deposits/Loans is coherent with this result, although it is not statistically significant once we control for the other finance instruments.
The explanatory variables on short-term sources of funds that finance the gap between loans and deposits are also positively related with banks productivity. The estimated coefficient of the variable IdB IBborrow/IB lend is positive and statistically significant at 1%, which implies that the higher the net borrowing position in interbank markets is, the higher is the bank productivity level 17 . The rest of the coefficients related to short-term finance are non-significant (maturity of wholesale finance and the dummy indicating whether or not the bank maintains a net borrowing position in interbank market). Therefore what matters for productivity is the net lending position in the interbank market, not the net borrowing one. Finally, the estimated coefficient of the equity capital ratio is negative and statistically significant. More leveraged banks have higher productivity than the less leveraged ones because the latter were expanding their balance sheets with non-core capital instruments. Nonetheless, these banks managed to keep their regulatory capital ratios relatively constant over time (see Table 3 ) because they issued hybrid and debt-like instruments that counted as regulatory capital.
Therefore, the positive effect of leverage on banks' productivity is due to the increase of leverage within regulatory capital, that is, the increasing weight of hybrid instruments in detriment of core capital.
Control variables
Ownership, size and market scope of banks affect banks' productivity. Saving banks are 25% less productive than commercial banks, while foreign subsidiaries are almost 20% more productive than national commercial banks 18 . Size of the banks has a positive effect on productivity, as well as concentration in local and regional markets.
Productivity of banks also varies with the quality of the productive inputs. The positive association between the average salaries of banks and their productivity suggests that higher salaries go together with more productive workers. Next, the positive (although not statistically significant) coefficient of human capital from training and the negative coefficient of the proportion of temporary employees point also to a positive effect of 17 On the contrary, the coefficients associated to lending position in the interbank market are not significant. 18 Berger (2007) reviews the literature on productivity comparisons between foreign subsidiaries and national banks; broadly, foreign subsidiaries tend to be more productive than national banks. The results of the comparison may be affected by differences in the portfolio of services and markets served by each group of banks.
human capital on bank's productivity. Finally, a higher proportion of advertising capital in the total operating capital of banks has also a positive effect on productivity.
Banks collecting more revenues in the form of net commissions (relative to total assets) are less productive, possibly because commissions are associated with services that banks provide to their customers and these services are not properly captured by the output measurement used in this paper. Since the inputs (labour and capital services)
involved to produce these services are effectively accounted for, we obtain that banks with a business profile more oriented to services that charge commissions are penalized in our productivity measure 19 . Table 5 also shows that a higher annual growth rate in the number of branches has a negative effect on productivity, possibly because of inputs' indivisibilities and lower occupation rate of existing branches' capacity. Next, we find that the organization of banking activities also matters for productivity. On the one side, the use of the internet channel has significant positive effects on banks productivity and, on the other side the effect of geographic diversification (proportion of overseas branches) also contributes in a significantly positive manner to productivity.
However, the proportion of employees in branches (and less in headquarters) and the size of the branch do not have significant effects on productivity. Finally, the involvement of banks in mergers or acquisitions and the relative loan loss provisions (as indicator of risk) do not have any significant effect on productivity.
The estimated coefficients of the macro variables included in Specification II
show that the inflation (measured as the growth of the consumer price index) has a negative effect on productivity and the interbank interest rate a positive one, whereas the GDP growth rate does not affect productivity.
Technical progress
The estimates of the dummy variables (not reported) in Specification I and the coefficient of the trend in Specification II provide a measure of technical progress, that is, productivity growth once we have accounted for other sources of heterogeneity.
In Specification I, the values of the estimated coefficients of the time dummies imply an average annual growth of 3.17% in the pre-Euro period (1993-1999) and of 19 We compute the net present value of the flow of commissions assuming a permanent annual flow equal to the current value of the net commissions using as discount factor the current value of the 12-month Interbank interest rate. When we recalculate the productivity measure and estimate the parameters in model (7), the variable commissions over total assets is no longer statistically significant, what would confirm our interpretation of the results.
3.26% in the post-Euro period. This estimate of productivity growth in the post Euro period is much lower than the gross 10% growth rate estimated without controlling for the sources of productivity differences considered in (7). These results also show that the trend in adjusted productivity growth in the pre-Euro period is maintained in the post-Euro period, that is, there are no differences in growth as those observed in gross productivity ( From these results, the conclusion must be that the extraordinary growth in aggregate productivity in the Spanish banking industry during the years after Spain joined the Euro zone cannot be attributed to a higher growth rate in technical progress. 
Robustness exercises
For robustness purposes, we have re-estimated the productivity growth attributed to technical change in the pre-and post-Euro period, starting with the re-estimation of the production function using alternative measures of output. First, we estimated the loans at constant prices using a price index for each bank that takes into account the differences in prices of real estate assets compared with the general inflation rate of the Spanish economy, as well as the different proportion of real estate loans granted by each bank. In this way, we correct for the over-estimation of the output in the second part of the period when inflation of real estate assets was higher. The basic results remain unchanged while the minimum differences in Specification I between the estimated average rate of technical progress in the pre-and the post-Euro period disappear (now, 3.3% in the two periods). Second, we construct a measure of output that is equal to a weighted geometric average of loans and deposits (with weights 0.4 and 0.6, respectively, which are the coefficients of an estimation of the cost function) as an alternative to the sum of loans and deposits. The main results do not change at all and, again, the differences in the average growth rate of technical progress for the two periods disappear.
Another robustness exercise has explored the estimation of the determinants of productivity (Table 5 ) using fixed effects, to check whether there is unobservable heterogeneity that is biasing the estimates. The results 21 show that the sign of the coefficients remains unchanged, as well as the magnitude, suggesting that the (long) list of explanatory variables included in the regressions capture relatively well the differences across banks and there is no relevant missing information that is biasing the results. Nonetheless, the significance in some coefficients has decreased or even become non-significant (for example salaries) what could be expected because the fixed-effect estimation drops out the cross-section variability and the coefficients are estimated less efficiently. 21 Results not shown in the paper. Available from the authors upon request.
In the Spanish banking industry the saving banks have significantly different ownership and governance characteristics compared with commercial banks. The empirical evidence reported in Table 5 shows that saving banks are on average less productive than commercial banks. We have examined if this difference in productivity has been stable over time. To do so, we generalize Specification I of Table 5 including as additional explanatory variable the interaction between the dummy variable Savings and the time dummy variables. None of the estimated coefficients for the cross-product of savings and time variables are statistically significant. Thus, no difference in the technical progress is observed between commercial and saving banks.
Conclusion
Efficient financial intermediation is a key factor for economic development. the return to scale properties of the production function is a key factor in mergers and restructuring decisions. Second, the estimated elasticity of the output of banks from IT capital services is twice the elasticity estimated using OLS. As this elasticity enters into find that the cumulative growth in IT capital per employee increased output per employee in 27% during the sample period (1.6% cumulative annual growth), revealing the high contribution of IT capital in the banking industry. Overall, the average annual cumulative growth rate in labour productivity was 4.4% during the sample period (1.6%
of IT capital contribution plus 2.8% of technical progress).
As for the measurement of the industry's technical progress, we find that Spanish banks participated of many of the causes that lead to the financial crisis after Spain joined the EMU. More than two thirds of the reported growth in banks' productivity was at the expense of fuelling a housing and real estate credit bubble, creating a liquidity gap between loans and deposits financed with MBS and with interbank loans and increasing financial leverage. This occurred at the same time that the industry maintained a steady annual growth rate in technical progress of 2.8%, similar to the rate in the pre Euro period.
More research is needed to advance in the knowledge on how to reconcile productivity estimates of individual banks with systemic measures of financial stability.
We believe that our approach offers a promising start. Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) propose using risk-free measures of output for banks in the calculations of productivity growth of banks within the KLEMS project 22 . One difficulty of this approach is how to obtain the appropriate price for risk. Our approach relies on quantities and does not require information on prices, a clear advantage taking into account the market failures affecting the pricing of risk.
the calculation of the contribution of IT to labour productivity growth, the estimated contribution of IT capital deepening to labour productivity growth using the OLS would have been half of what it really is. Using the estimates controlling for simultaneity, we 22 The KLEMS-project serves as an international platform, coordinated by the EU, in which national research and data collection efforts are supported and co-ordinated to create a database on measures of economic growth, productivity, employment creation, capital formation and technological change at the industry level with a clear emphasis on the need for international comparability. 
